Honest behavior is not enough
A mechanism can look efficient under compliant agents and fail once participants misreport, delay, collude, or optimize against procedural edge cases.
Mechanism Arena is a research-grade framework for testing auctions, marketplaces, reputation systems, token economies, underwriting workflows, and other incentive structures against adaptive, tool-using AI agents.
Given mechanism M
and strategic agents A₁...Aₙ:
What profitable deviations,
collusive equilibria,
sybil attacks,
information exploits,
and enforcement failures
can capable agents discover?
Object under test:
the mechanism, not the model.
Formal mechanism design is powerful, but real systems face bounded rationality, communication, reputation, imperfect enforcement, sybil identities, adaptive strategy discovery, and machine-speed participants.
A mechanism can look efficient under compliant agents and fail once participants misreport, delay, collude, or optimize against procedural edge cases.
Tool-using agents can simulate strategies, remember interactions, coordinate in natural language, and rapidly search for profitable deviations.
Mechanisms should be fuzzed like software: not with random bytes, but with strategic behaviors that trigger undesirable outcomes.
Mechanism Arena treats the economic mechanism as executable infrastructure and the agent population as an adversarial stress-testing substrate.
Mix honest agents, scripted strategic agents, LLM agents, tool-using agents, collusion-seeking agents, and exploit-seeking red-team agents.
Measure allocations, payoffs, welfare, revenue, exploitability, stability, collusion, sybil resistance, audit failures, and distributional effects.
Vary what agents observe: public prices, individual bids, reputation, audit signals, counterparty identity, private messages, and historical traces.
Convert discovered exploits into mechanism patches, rerun counterfactuals, and add regression tests for known failure modes.
The LLM chooses actions. The mechanism engine enforces rules. The evaluation harness measures outcomes. The experiment runner searches for failures.
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| Experiment Runner |
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v v v
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| Mechanism Engine | | Agent Runtime | | Evaluation |
| | | | | Harness |
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| | |
v v v
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| State Ledger | | Tool Layer | | Metrics Store |
+-------------------+ +----------------+ +----------------+
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v v v
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| Trace / Audit Log |
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Bid shading, bid rotation, false competition, cartel formation, sniping, and reserve manipulation.
Fake reviews, reciprocal ratings, identity resets, selective participation, and metric gaming.
Sybil farming, reward extraction, wash activity, governance capture, and collusive voting.
Selective disclosure, broker steering, audit avoidance, misclassification, and adverse selection.
Task auctions, quality verification, escrow, agent reputation, dispute handling, and verifier gaming.
Coalition formation, agenda control, bribery, quorum manipulation, and procedural exploits.
A full project framing with motivation, architecture, experimental methodology, metrics, failure taxonomy, and technical roadmap.